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striction against the construction of a church had been waived
by all the parties. However, the injunction against them was
sustained. The earlier waiver was only a single instance of
departure from the residential covenant out of several hundred
lots in the subdivision; this could certainly not be evaluated
as substantially defeating the general plan.
In Leonard v. Lavigne,40 there was a recorded lease in which
the landowner bound himself, and his heirs and assigns, not to
make competitive use of any of his adjacent property. This
stipulation was breached, and the question was whether the
restriction was a covenant running with the land or merely a
personal obligation. The trial court said it was merely a personal obligation; the court of appeal held it was a covenant
running with the land. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding that the court of appeal had
relied on common law sources. The Supreme Court stressed the
reminder that "while these rules of common law jurisprudence
are sometimes persuasive, they are not controlling under our
system of civil law, particularly since we have codal provisions
4
that are to the contrary." '

There is the "real obligation" which attaches to immovable
property under Civil Code article 2010, but the lease provision in the case under discussion was clearly a personal obligation. Building restrictions are recognized as limitations on the
use of land and are likened to servitudes, but real servitudes
constitute relationships between estates belonging to different
owners and cannot exist between a lessor and lessee.

SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTS

In Succession of Anderson' the validity of a statutory will
was contested on the ground that it had not been signed by the
testator. The testament contained the testator's declaration that
40. 245 La. 1004, 162 So. 2d 341 (1964), reversing 153 So. 2d 544 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963).
41. Id. at 1007, 162 So. 2d at 343.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 159 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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he did not know how to sign his name and therefore affixed his
mark thereto with the assistance of the undersigned notary.
Basing its decision on Succession of Butler,2 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal held that it was not sacramental to the validity
of the testament, which was otherwise executed in accordance
with the statute,3 that the testator should literally write his
name on the instrument, and that the "X" mark placed thereon
by the testator, with the intent of making it his signature, fulfilled the requirements of the law.4 This decision, as well as the
rule of the Butler case, has been effectively overruled legislatively by Act 123 of 19645 which amends R.S. 9:2442 and R.S.
9:2443 to provide that "those who know not how or are not able
to sign their names" lack the capacity to make dispositions in
the form of the statutory will. (Emphasis added.)
In Succession of Guidry,6 the court held that a will which is
otherwise confected in accordance with the provisions of the
statutory wills act is not invalid because it has not been dictated
to the person who typed it or in the presence of the notary and
the witnesses, or because the testator failed to express verbally
his signification that the instrument was his last will and testament. The statutory wills act does not require the observance
of these formalities which apply chiefly to nuncupative wills by
public or private acts.
A much more interesting question arose in Succession of
Maltese,7 wherein a testament, initially intended as a statutory
will and invalid as such because of the incapacity of the testator
to make such a will," was offered for probate as a nuncupative
will by private act. For the proponents, it was shown that the
will contained the signatures of four witnesses, including the
notary; that the fifth witness required by article 1582 of the
2. 152 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 244 La. 668, 153 So. 2d
153, noted 24 LA. L. REV. 184 (1964).
3. LA. R.S. 9:2442-9:2443 (Supp. 1962).
4. But the question seems to be, not whether the "X" mark of the testator
constitutes a valid signature but whether the testator who does not know how to
sign his name has the capacity to make this type of a will. Cf. Succession of
Guidry, 145 So. 2d 613, 616 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. den., where the court
states: "The contention of appellees that the cross or X mark . . . satisfies the
requirement of signature .. . is clearly without foundation under the laws of this
state."
5. Discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1964, 25 LA. L. REV. 18-19 (1964).
6. 160 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
7. 155 So. 2d 208 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
8. The testimony showed conclusively that the testator had never known how
to read or write.
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Civil Code had been present during the entire making of the
will, and that he was ready, able, and willing now to subscribe
his name as a witness. The court properly holds that under the
clear and unambiguous language of the code article, the mere
presence of the witness is not sufficient. To permit such a witness to sign after the confection of the will, the court pointed
out, would open the doors wide to fraud, substitution and imposition. 9
In McGuffin v. Jones,10 the question at issue was whether
the name of the testator, appearing at the end of the olographic
testament and as a part of the last sentence of the dispositive
provisions, should be considered as the signature of the testator." Referring to and distinguishing previously adjudicated
decisions, 12 the court had no difficulty in inferring from the
position of the testator's name, which was centered in a separate
line, that the testator clearly intended it as his signature."3
The testamentary capacity of the testatrix was at issue in
Succession of Turner.14 The evidence and testimony showed that
shortly after the confection of the will the testatrix had been
admitted to the North Louisiana Sanitarium and later committed to the Central Louisiana State Hospital on the complaint
that she was "forgetful of most recent events; worries a great
deal; talks to herself; . . . wanders around the house all night
9. It is doubtful whether a will initially intended as a statutory will could
be probated as a nuncupative will by private act even if subscribed to by the
necessary number of witnesses in view of the other requirements of articles 1581
and 1582 of the Civil Code as to dictation, presentment, and reading of the will,
which are not necessarily or usually observed in the making of a statutory will.
10. 157 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
11. The will was as follows:
Feb. 18-1952
"I am writing my will, of my personal belonging and
real estate
At my death my brother Claude Jones, gets my personal and
real estate property,
the court house record shows as Larry Jones, same as
"Lowery Fornie Jones."
12. In re Poland's Estate, 137 La. 219, 68 So. 415 (1915) ; Succession of
Dyer, 155 La. 265, 99 So. 214 (1924) ; Succession of Fitzhugh, 170 La. 122, 127
So. 386 (1930).
13. "Our view of the jurisprudence . . . convinces us that in order for there
to be a compliance with the requirement of article 1588 . . . that an olographic
will be signed, it is necessary (1) that the testator in writing his name on the
will must have intended to sign it; and (2) that the signature of the testator
must appear at the end of the will, or it must have been affixed at such a place
on the document and in such a manner as to indicate clearly that the name as
written was intended by the testator to be his signature to the entire completed
will." McGuffin v. Jones, 157 So. 2d 256, 258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
14. 157 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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and wants to come to town, says she has business to attend to;
talks incessantly; . . . does not recognize her own clothing."

Yet the opinion of her personal physician, and that of the notary
who executed the will, was that she was mentally competent
at the time the will was made. Under these circumstances, the
court found that the evidence adduced by the opponents was
insufficient to establish testamentary incapacity.
In Succession of Shows,15 the olograph of the decedent offered for probate was in the following form: "Dec. 3-61. All
to My Sister" followed by the signature of the testatrix. Although it was admitted that the paper in question was entirely
written by the deceased, and that in all probability she intended
it as her last will, the First Circuit Court of Appeal, two judges
dissenting, concluded that it lacked the necessary animus testandi, and refused to admit it for probate. In affirming the
decision, 16 the Supreme Court states: "A mere perusal of the
instrument sought to be probated in the case at bar discloses it
totally lacks any language to indicate the animus testandi of the
decedent and the necessary words to constitute a valid will.'
SIMULATED TRANSACTIONS-

7

RIGHTS OF FORCED HEIRS

Both in Succession of Clark' and in Succession of Lewis, 9
the rights of forced heirs to annul the simulated transactions
of those from whom they inherit, were at issue. In the Lewis
case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal had no difficulty in
concluding that, since the transactions complained of were
clearly simulations, the plaintiff forced heir had a perfect right,
under article 2239 of the Civil Code, to have the transactions
declared absolute nullities and to treat them as such. But in the
Clark case, the meaning and application of article 2239 raised
doubts in the same court. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
his father, who had died intestate, had "purportedly" sold a
15. 158 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
16. Succession of Shows, 246 La. 652, 166 So. 2d 261 (1964).
17. 166 So. 2d at 263. The court of appeal had relied on Succession of Foggard, 152 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) from which it quoted approvingly
as follows: "Nor does the instrument contain the words 'give' 'donate' 'will'
'bequeath' 'devise' or any other word establishing or even indicating that it is a
dispositon of a last will." Is the court being unduly technical in requiring "words
of.disposability" for the validity of a testamentary disposition? Cf. Succession of
Ehrenberg, 21 La. Ann. 280 (1869), in which the olograph admitted to probate
was as follows: "Mrs. Sophie Loper is my heiress."
18. 155 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
19. 157 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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piece of property to the plaintiff's grandfather, which transaction he sought to set aside as a simulation under the express
terms of the code article. Alternatively, the plaintiff also alleged a donation in disguise, the price of the thing sold having
been less than one-fourth the real value thereof. 20 The exception of prescription to the action of nullity based on the principal allegation of simulation was properly overruled since the
21
action is imprescriptible.
The exception of no cause of action was maintained against
the alternative demand that the transaction was a donation in
disguise, since article 2442 of the Civil Code applied only to
sales made by parents to their children, and not to sales by children to their parents. 22 But the exception of no cause of action
against the alleged simulation seemed to have confused the court
somewhat, for it concluded that the petitioner had a right to
"annul or reduce the transfer of which he complains only if
such transfer exceeds the disposable portion and thus impinges
upon the legitime. ' 23 (Emphasis added.) The court took the
position that "where the act of transfer recites a consideration
even though there is none, the act may be considered as and
given the effect of a valid gratuitous donation if the transferor
had the right to make the donation, i.e. if the same does not impinge upon the legitime. ' '24 (Emphasis added.) Obviously, the
question is not whether the "sale" exceeds the disposable portion, but whether there is animus donandi on the part of the
"vendor," for if the latter intends to part with title, a donation
subject to reduction results, whereas in the absence of any
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2444 (1870) : "The sale of immovable property made
by parents to their children, may be attacked by the forced heirs, as containing
a donation in disguise, if the latter can prove that no price has been paid, or that
the price was below one-fourth of the real value of the immovable sold, at the
time of the sale."
21. Guilbeau v. Thibodeau, 30 La. Ann. 1099 (1878). Nevertheless the court
prefers to overrule the exception on the ground that the prescriptive period had
not accrued: "Aside from the question of whether or not an action against the
vendee to annul a simulated sale is prescriptible . . . the simple answer to the
argument .. .is that such prescription, even if applicable did not run the required
10 years. It is clear that prescription cannot run against a cause of action which
has not accrued . . . . Here the petitioner did not have a cause of action while
his father was alive and the latter's death occurred less than 3 years prior to
the time the petition was filed." Succession of Clark, 155 So. 2d 37, 39 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963).
22. Id. at 40: "The article specifically refers to sales by parents to their
children, mentions no other, and applies only to such sales. See Dare v. Myrick,
226 La. 732, 737, 77 So. 2d 21, 23. It has no application to the instant case
which involves a sale by a child to his parent and it cannot be so extended."
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
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intention on his part to make a gratuitous disposition or to part
with title, the transaction is only a sham and can have no effect
whatsoever, because there has never been an actual divestiture
of title. This is the reason why the action is imprescriptible,
and why under article 2239 the heirs of the "vendor" are permitted by parol to have such transactions declared null and void,
and are not "restricted to the legitime." Since, the allegations
of the petition must be taken as true for the purposes of the
exception of no cause of action, the transaction should have
been considered as a simple simulation and as such void in its
25
entirety.
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS

In line with the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Winsberg v. Winsberg,26 which announced the rule that the designation by a purchaser of United States savings bonds of a beneficiary to whom the bonds are payable upon the purchaser's
death constitutes an additional method of disposing mortis
causa, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the designation of an alternative payee by the purchaser of such bonds,
constitutes a new method of executing a donation inter vivos
of such bonds. 27 But the court also made the significant statement that, although federal savings bonds are governed exclusively by federal law, problems such as the extent to which these
bonds figure in the calculation of inheritance taxes, or of the
legitime of forced heirs and the rights of children born subsequent to the designation of the beneficiary or alternative payee,
28
are matters which are governed by state law.
USUFRUCT UNDER ARTICLE 916

In Succession of Norton,29 Mrs. Norton died survived by her
husband and four children of her marriage to Mr. Norton. When
25. Perhaps the error in which the court seems to have fallen is attributable
to the ambiguous, and therefore, faulty allegations in the plaintiff's petition in
which he sets forth two mutually exclusive allegations, viz. : that the "purported"

sale was "false, unreal and [a] simulated sale;" and in the same breath that
it was in fact "an attempted donation in disguise." This could have been overlooked, however, in view of the positive alternative allegation of a disguised
donation, if the court found that a price had been actually paid.

26. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
27. Succession of Weis, 162 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
28. "It is to what extent those bonds figure in calculating the inheritance
tax or a legitime or an interference with the rights of a child born subsequently
to the naming of a payee on death that the state law governs." Id. at 794.

29. 157 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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her succession was judicially opened, the four children renounced her succession which consisted of her one-half interest
in the pre-existing community, whereupon Mr. Norton petitioned to be recognized as the sole surviving heir of his deceased
wife.30 In a novel decision, the majority of the court took the
position that in determining the inheritance tax due by the surviving spouse, the value of the usufruct under article 916 should
be deducted from the value of the property because the surviving
spouse did not acquire such usufruct by inheritance. The dissenting judge, who in the opinion of this writer is eminently'
correct, clearly points out the error in which the majority of
the court seems to have fallen. The usufruct of article 916
attaches only to the share which is inherited by the issue of the
marriage. When the latter renounce their share of their parent's
succession, the succession accrues to the surviving spouse in the
same manner as if there had never been any issue. Therefore,
the surviving parent takes the property in full ownership, and
consequently there should be no occasion to deduct the value of
the usufruct for inheritance tax purposes.
In Succession of Heckert,31 the plaintiffs were recognized as
heirs of their mother, and as such sent into possession of her
one-half interest in certain corporate shares acquired by their
father during his marriage to the deceased. The judgment also
recognized their father as surviving spouse in community, and
as such entitled to the usufruct on the stock in question. About
a year later the father married the defendant, but failed to
deliver to the plaintiffs their one-half of the corporate shares,
the certificates of which he continued to hold in his name.
During his marriage to the defendant, which lasted until his
death some twenty-one year later, the father made gratuitous
dispositions of the majority of this stock in the defendant's
favor. Upon the father's death the plaintiffs instituted an action against the defendant individually and in her capacity as
testamentary executrix, seeking, among other things, to recover
the stock which their father had disposed of to their prejudice.
To this action the defendant interposed the exception of ten
years prescription liberandi causa, based on the proposition that
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 915 (1870) : "When either husband or wife shall die,
leaving neither father nor mother nor descendants, and without having disposed
by last will and testament of his or her share of the community property, such
undisposed of share shall be inherited by the surviving spouse in full ownership."
31. 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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the plaintiffs' action was in the nature of an accounting for the
imperfect usufruct which their father had on the stock. The
court held that the usufruct on corporate stock is not an imperfect but a perfect usufruct since the usufructuary need not
.sell, alienate, or change the substance of the property in order
'to enjoy it, the usufructuary being entitled to the fruits in the
form of dividends. Accordingly, the court held, the alienation
of the stock in question was in breach of the usufructuary's
fiduciary obligation, and their rights to recover the same could
not prescribe, for under the provisions of article 3510. prescription cannot run in favor of the usufructuary as against the
82
rights of naked owners.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Robert A. Pascal*
Article 2408 of the Civil Code is the only Louisiana legislation on accounting between the separate and common interests
of the spouses on the termination of the community of acquets
and gains and it foresees only one type of case, the increase
in the value of a separate asset of either spouse by their "common labor, expenses, or industry." Here the "other spouse" is
entitled to receive one-half of the increase in value. Tooley v.
Pennison1 presented the case of one spouse's separate asset,
acquired before marriage on credit, being paid for in part after
marriage with common funds. Clearly there is no question in
,this instance of the augmentation of the value of the asset, but
rather a payment of a separate obligation with common funds,
and thus the court properly decided that the spouse whose separate obligation had been paid should reimburse the common or
2
community fund for the amounts so expended.
. 32. "As relates to the facts in the present case, were this Court to say that
since the petitioners did not assert their rights to the stocks within ten years
after the termination of the usufruct, their rights have prescribed; we would
actually be saying that there can be acquisitive prescription under a usufruct.
Such a holding would be directly contrary to the clear and express provision
of Civil Code Art. 3510." Id. at 381.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 157 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
2. The same decision also declared that land in a separate property state,
bought in the husband's name with common funds, belonged to the husband, but
that the husband must reimburse the common fund. Id. at 630. This questionable
solution is discussed in the Conflict of Laws portion of this Symposium.

